Missouri Law Review
Volume 66
Issue 3 Summer 2001

Article 2

Summer 2001

Times They Are A-Changin': Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace,
The
Erica D. O'Loughlin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Erica D. O'Loughlin, Times They Are A-Changin': Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, The, 66 MO. L. REV.
(2001)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss3/2

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

O'Loughlin: O'Loughlin: Times They Are A-Changin'

Notes
The Times They Are A-Changin':
Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Citigroup,Inc. v. City Holding Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The internetwas developed in 1969 during the Cold War as the ARPANET,
a defense tool that allowed for a decentralized computer network capable of rerouting communications if one or more links were destroyed during nuclear war
or any other disaster.2 Today, the internet has become an integral part of daily
life. It seems that everyone is online. From local elementary schools to Fortune
500 companies, people are utilizing the internet as an efficient and relatively
inexpensive way to communicate, sell their products and services, and conduct
everyday activities, such as sending flowers, renting a car, managing bank
accounts, or searching for a new home. This new technology, however, has
created some problems.
This Note evaluates the difficulty in deciding what type of internet activity
will support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. There
are some discrepancies among federal court decisions as courts have been left to
their own devices to decidetheseissues withoutguidancefrom the Supreme Court
As declared by one commentator, and expressed by the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon inMillennium Enterprises,Inc.v. Millennium
Music, LP,3 "the case law dealing with the exercise ofpersonaljurisdictionbased
on an Interactive Website [is] a 'current hodgepodge
of case law [which] is
4
inconsistent, irrational, and irreconcilable.'"1
H. FACTS AND HOLDING
Citigroup, the plaintiff, was a Delaware corporation with its principal office
inNew York City.5 The defendants were City Holding Company, aWest Virginia
corporation with its principal office in Cross Lanes, West Virginia, and City

1. 97 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
2. See Robert Craig Waters,AnlnfernetPrimer,44 FED. LAw. 33,35 (Feb. 1997).
3. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D.Or. 1999).
4. David Bender, Jurisdictionin Cyberspace, 590 PLI/PAT 27, 83 (Feb. 2000)
(citing Howard B. Stravitz, PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace: SomethingMore Is
Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 925, 939 (1998)).
5. Citigroup,97 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
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National, a subsidiary of City Holding Company, a West Virginia corporation
with its principal office in Charleston, West Virginia.6 The complaint in this
action, filed on September 29, 1999, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York alleged that City Holding's use of the "CITY" and
"CITY"-prefixed marks along with a particular logo infringed Citigroup's
trademark rights in a family of "CITI' service marks.' Before the Court of the
Southern District of New York, City Holding moved to dismiss for lack of
personal 8jurisdiction or to transfer the case to the Southern District of West
Virginia.
City Holding was not registered to do business in New York, had no real
estate, no directors, officers or employees, or no bank accounts in New York, and
earned no income in New York.' City Holding was, however, the owner of the
CITY marks, most of which were used by City Holding's subsidiaries.' City
Holding was also the named plaintiff in a separate declaration judgment action in
West Virginia pertaining to the CITY marks."
City National used the allegedly infringing CITY marks in various ways to
solicit business. 2 City National conducted a nationwide mortgage business
through two divisions, City Mortgage and City Lending. 13 City National
maintained two web sites, the City Lending site and the City Mortgage site,
on
which customers could obtain information on City National's loan products and
services; in addition, customers could fill out loan applications online or download
applications to submitviafacsimile.' 4 Furthermore, potential customers, including
New York residents, could use the web site to "chat" with City National loan
15
representatives.
City National used direct mailings displaying the allegedly infringing marks
to solicit New York businesses. 6 These mailings included a toll-free number, the
web site addresses, and the statement that "CityNational is a 'Licensed Mortgage

6. Id. at 554.
7. Id. City Holding filed a parallel lawsuit on November 5, 1999, in the Southern
District of West Virginia seeking a declaratoiry judgment that its family of CITY marks
did not infinge Citigroup's protected intellectual property rights. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 566.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 570.
14. Id. at 565.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 567.
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Banker, NYS Banking Department""..,17 Moreover, CityNationalusedNew York
companies for recording mortgages onbehalfofCity Financial Services to prfect
liens on real property located in New York in order to secure specific loan
contracts.' 8
CityNational's motionto dismiss for lack ofpersonaljurisdictionwas denied
bythe court' 9 In the court's analysis of thejurisdiction issue, it found sufficient
evidence that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over City Holding was
permissible under New York's long arm statute. The courtpointedtotheuseof
New York companies to perfect liens onreal propertyinNew York, coupled with
the company's internet activity, to show that specificjurisdictionwas properunder
the first section of the long arm statute, which provided for specific jurisdiction
over a person who transacts any business within the state.2' According to the
court, City Holding's transmissions to New Yorkresidents of chatmessages that
contained the allegedly infinging marks constituted the type of interet activity
that supported jurisdiction under the section of the long arm statute providing for
jurisdiction over apersonwho commits atortious actwithinthe state." The direct
mailings used by City Holding were also shown as evidence of an attempt to pass

17. Id. at 570.
18. Id.at 565.
19. Id.at 570.
20. Id. at 564. New York's long ann statute states:
Acts which are the basis ofjurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over anynon-domiciliary, orhis executor or adtministor, who in
person or through an agent

1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply
goods or services within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation or character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious actwithout the state causing injmyto person orproperty
within the state, except as to the cause of action for defamation of character
arising from the act, if he
(1)regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any otherpersistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
('n)
expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (IcKinney 1990 & Supp. 2001).
21. Citigroup,97 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
22. Id. at 567.
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the marks within New York and strengthened the finding ofspecificjurisdictioi '
Finally, the court held that the passing of the allegedly infringing marks by City
Holding caused injuryto Citigroup by confusing potential customers.24 The court
declined to decide the issue of general jurisdiction and, instead, relied on its
finding of specific jurisdiction.'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. ConstitutionalExercise ofPersonalJurisdiction
"Personal jurisdiction is the power a court may assert over . . . a
defendant.1 26 The territorial concept provided bythe Supreme Court inPennoyer
v. Neffr is the original basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.28 The Court
held that, in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction, a defendant must be
physically within the state, waive jurisdiction, own property in the state, or be a
resident of the state.2 9 This holding allowed states to assert personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident who was present in a given state, even if only for a moment,
but it left the states unable to exercise jurisdiction over people or property beyond
state lines. 30 The Court further held that if a state court had no jurisdiction, any
proceedings in that state's courts to determine the rights and obligations of a party
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3

23. Id.

24. Id.at 568.
25. Id. at 571.

26. David M. Stockwell, Let the Seller Beware: Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace,21 WHrrrERL. REV. 881, 889 (2000). Personaljurisdiction is a "court's
power to bring a person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a defendant's
personal rights, rather than merely over property interests." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
857 (7th ed. 1999).
27. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

28. See Felix C. Pelzer, Unchartered Territory: PersonalJurisdiction in the
InternetAge, 51 S.C. L. REv. 745, 747 (2000).
29. Pennoyer,95 U.S. at 720.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 733. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of lavr,nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Nashington32 remedied
some of the problems created in Pennoyerby developing amore flexible standard
of personal jurisdiction 3 International Shoe Company was a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri2
International Shoe did not have an office in Washington; International Shoe,
however, did have salesmen in Washington who were paid on a commission
basis." The salesmen had the authority to show the product, solicit orders, and
send those orders to St Louis where they were filled by shipments from factories
outside of Washington.3"
The StateofWashingtonassessedunemploymentompensationtaxes against
International Shoe, which the company refused to pay.3" International Shoe
disputed its dutyto pay, inpart, because itwas not doing business in Washington,
and was not aWashingtoncorporation. WhenWashingtoncourts disagreedwith
International Shoe's argument, the company appealed to the Supreme Court and
argued that solicitation within the state was not sufficient to give Washington the
authority to enforce the unemployment tax assessment.3 9
The more flexible standard created by the Court required a non-resident
defendant to have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend the traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. 40 The Court further identified four rules of reason to be
usedbycourts as guidelines whendeterminingifthe defendant's contacts withthe
state were sufficient to exercise personaljurisdiction. 4 First, the activities must
have been continuous and systematic. 2 Second, some continuous activities may
have been so substantial that they justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction---even ifunrelated to the in-state activities.' Third, because of their

nature and quality, some single or occasional acts justify the exercise ofpersonal
jurisdiction arising fromthe in-state activity.4 Fourth, casualpresence orisolated

32. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, The Minimum Contacts Test: An Emerging
Standard of ConstitutionalPersonalJurisdiction,85 ILL. B.J. 58, 60 (1997).
34. Int'lShoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 314.
37. Id. at 312.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 314-15.
40. Id. at316 (quoting Mllliken v.Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
41. Id. at317.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 318.
44. Id.
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activity will not support the exercise of jurisdiction in a matter unrelated to the
activities.4" The Court concluded that International Shoe could be sued in
Washington because its activities were continuous and systematic, and because
the company received protection under the state's laws.46 Because the suit arose
from the company's activities within the state, the Court held that the state proved
International Shoe met the minimum contacts standard.47
The Supreme Court's decision in InternationalShoe still provides the
foundation for all due process analysis, but the Court has refined the minimum
contacts test to keep up with the times.48 In World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,49 the Court held that, in order for a non-resident defendant to be
subjected to the forum state's authority, he or she must engage in conduct that
makes being haled into court in the forum state reasonably foreseeable."0
According to the Court, foreseeabilityis criticalto due process; thus, the test is not
satisfied by the mere likelihood that the product would find its way to the forum
state, but, rather, that "a corporate defendant must purposely avail itself to the
privileges and benefits of the forum state so that the defendant will have notice
that it maybe sued in that forum."' In societytoday, as opposed to inthe days of
InternationalShoe, it is far less burdensome for a party to defend a lawsuit in a
state where he or she engages in economic activity because of technological
advances thatmake transportation and communicationmore efficient. 2 Therefore,
the Court held that, when deciding whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over anon-resident defendant is proper, courts must consider more than the burden
on the defendant.5 3 The Court enumerated the following factors: burden on the
defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the shared interest
of the several states in furthering flndamental substantive social policies, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies.54
In World Wide Volkswagen, New York car owners brought suit against
defendants in Oklahoma, the state in which the plaintiffs were injured when their

45. 1d. at 317.
46. Id. at 320.
47. Id.
48. Gaumer, supra note 33, at 61.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

444 U.S. 286 (1980).

Id. at 290-94.
Pelzer,supranote 28, at 748.
World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-93.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 288-90.
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car caught fire after being hit from behind." The defendants included World
Wide Volkswagen Corporation, the New York dealer, and an East Coast Audi
distributor.56 The state court denied the defendants' motion to dismi for lack of
personal jurisdiction." The Supreme Court held that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was improper. 58
The plaintiffs argued that it was foreseeable for an automobile to travel to
another state. 9 The Court held that the mere likelihood that a car would travel
into a state does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction; this, in essence,
would allow for nationwide jurisdiction. 6 Instead, the defendant intentionally
must guide the product into the state or place the product in the stream of
commerce with the expectation that the product will be purchased by citizens in
the forum state."'
The Supreme CourtinBurger~IngCorp.v.Rudzewic further clarified the
constitutional requirements of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by state courts. ' Burger King Corporation, a Florida
corporationwith its principal place of business in Miami, entered into a franchise
agreementwithresidents of Michigan.1 The Michiganfranchiseholders attended
training sessions in Miami, negotiated the agreement with the Miami office, and
bought equipment from Miami.6 5 When a dispute arose between the two parties,
Burger King filed suit in federal court in Florida.6' The trial court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the appellate
court reversed the lower court's decision. ' The Supreme Court subsequently
reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the defendants was proper.6' The Court set forth the key factor
inminimum contacts analysis: whetherthe defendantpurposefully directedhis or
her activities at the forum state.6" The Court further held that the defendants had

55. Id. at 289.
56. Id. at 286.
57. Id. at 291.
58. Id.
59. Id.at 295.
60. Id. at 295-96.
61. Id.at 297-98.
62. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
63. See Gaumer, supranote 33, at 61.
64. BurgerKing,471 U.S. at 466-67.
65. Id. at466.
66. Id. at462.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 487.
69. Id. at 472-73.
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enough contacts with Florida to satisfy due process."0 The defendants established
a substantial relationship with the Florida corporation, received notice through
franchise documents that a suit in Florida was possible, and failed to establish that
it was unfair to subject them to personal jurisdiction in Florida.71
The preceding Supreme Court decisions set out the constitutional
requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. All assertions ofpersonaljurisdictionmust
satisfy the above-noted requirements in order to withstand a constitutional
challenge. These requirements are applied by courts to determine if a defendant's
contacts, including internet contacts, are sufficient to support the exercise of
personaljurisdiction. Two other generaltheories often discussed incases inwhich
the defendant's internet activity was used to establish personal jurisdiction are:
(1) the stream of commerce theory, and (2) the effects test. Before considering
individual cases, these theories are set forth.
The stream of commerce theory rejected by the Supreme Court in World
Wide Volkswagen has been discussed in a number ofinternet jurisdiction cases.7"
In 1997, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King 3 stated: "Creating a site, like placing a
product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even
worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed at the forum
state."74 The next year, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York in American Network, Inc. v. Access America/ConnectAtlanta,
Inc.,"5 found that the totality of the defendant's contacts, not the establishment of
the web site alone, demonstrated that the defendant had purposely availed itself
to the privileges of New York 76
The effects test, established by the Supreme Court in Calderv. Jones," is a
second, frequentlymentioned theme ininternetjurisdiction cases.7 In Calder,the
Supreme Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction by a California court over a

70. Id. at 478.
71. Id. at 479-80.
72. See Bender, supra note 4, at 52-53; see also David L. Stott, Personal
Jurisdictionin Cyberspace: The ConstitutionalBoundaryofMinimum ContactsLimited
to a Website, 15 J.MARsHALLJ. ConurER& Iirwo. L. 819,838-40 (1997) (analyzing the
stream of commerce theory as applied in World Wide Volkswagen).
73. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
74. Id. at 301.
75. 975 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The defendant had six New York
subscribers, which constituted 0.08% ofthe defendant's customer base, in additionto its
internet use. Id. at 496.
76. See Bender, supra note 4, at 55.
77. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
78. Id. at 788-89.
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non-resident employee of a national magazine who allegedly hbeled a California
resident was proper.79 The effects test requires that a defendant commit an
intentional tort' s Also, it requires that the plainti feel the brunt of the harm
caused bythe tort in the forum state.8' Finally, the testrequires thatthe defendant
aim his or her tortious conduct at the foran state in such amanner thatthe forum
canbe said to be the focal point of the activity.' In Calder,the allegedlylibelous
story originated from California sources, concerned a California citizen, and
caused harm in California; as a result, jurisdiction was held appropriate in
California based on the effects of the defendant's Florida conduct'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the effects
test in Panavision,International,L.P.v. Toeppen, in which the court held that
the effect of the defendant trying to extort money from the plaintiff by registering
the plaintiff's mark as a domain name would be injury likely suffered in the
plaintiff's forum, a fact likely known by the defendant' The same courtrejected
the test in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., where the court distinguished
Calderon two grounds.' First, in Cybersell, a trademark infringement case, the
court viewed the web site as passive and, as such, did notimake the forum state the
focal point of the infringement' In contrast, the story written by the defendant
in Calderwas focused on a California resident and the harn causedby the article

was suffered in California.'
B. Three Ranges oflnternetActivity
The United States District Court for the Western District ofPennsylvania in
Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo DotCorn, Inc., °distinguished three ranges of
internet activity to be considered when determining whether personaljurisdiction

79. Id. at 791.
80. See id. at 789.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 790.
83. Id.at 788-89.
84. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 1318.
86. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997), see also Bender, supra note 4, at 56 (C'This
'effects' test was also discussed in Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc. which rejected its
applicability there on two bases.").
87. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.

88. Id.
89. Calderv. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,789 (1984).

90. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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maybe constitutionally asserted over anon-resident defendant.9 The court found
thatpersonal jurisdiction maybeproperly exercised over a defendant who actively
conducts business overtheinternet.' A defendant who conducts business over the
internet has an interactive web site." An interactive web site will allow a
customer to purchase products or services through the site. For example, assume
that Charlie, a small business owner, creates a web site that allows customers to
order products, pay online by credit card, and have the products shipped to their
homes. Charlie's web site is interactive because it allows business to be
conducted over the internet.
Next, the Zippo courtfoundthat, because a passive web site merely provides
information to users, itis not sufficient to support personal jurisdiction.94 Assume
that Charlie created a web site that merelylists the hours of business and products
offered for sale. This web site, without more, most likely would be considered a
passive web site.
Finally, the court addressed the middle ground ofinteractivity," which is the
most difficult to comprehend. To illustrate, assume Charlie posts information on
his web site and also has a feature that allows customers to email him in order to
receive price quotes or advice. This probably would be in the middle range of
interactivity.
The court in Zippo recommended a "sliding scale" approach in which "the
exercise ofjurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and
the commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the web
site. 6 "While widely adopting this basic framework, federal courts have
struggled to apply the 'sliding scale' approach with regard to Internet contacts
falling withinthe middle ground." Courts have made distinctions as to what type
of additional activity will avail a defendant of a forum's laws in personal
jurisdiction disputes with minimum contacts limited to a web site on the internet."

91. Id. at 1124; see Stott, supranote 72, at 842-43; see also Bender, supranote 4,
at 61. Although Zippo appears to be the first case to adopt such a categorization, this
method of dividing the cases has been followed in Blumenthalv. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.
44 (D.D.C. 1998), SFHotel Co., LP v. Energy Invs., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan.
1997), and TranscraftCorp.v. DoonanTrailerCorp., No. 97C4943,1997 WL 733905,
at *1(N.D. 11M.
Nov. 17, 1997).
92. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Stockwell, supranote26, at 896 (citing Coastal Video Communications, Corp.
v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571-72 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1999); GTE New Media
Serv. Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1999)).
98. See Stott supranote 72, at 842.
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Because diverse factors have been used to categorize internet activity under the
Zippo sliding scale approach, there are inconsistencies in the decisions of the
federal courts."
C. GeneralandSpecific Jurisdiction
There are essentially two types of jurisdiction-general and specific.
Generaljurisdictionis based on a defendant's presence and activities intheforum,
regardless of whether they are related to the cause of action." "Specific
jurisdictionis a form ofpersonal jurisdictionthat arises fromthe defendanthaving
certain 'minimum contacts' with the forum state and permits the court to assert
01
personal jurisdiction only in cases that arise from those 'minimum contacts.""
Courts must comply with both the forum state's long arm statute and due process
to assert either specific or general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant"
For clarity, the discussion of whether certain internet contacts will support
personaljurisdictionwillbe divided into two categories, general and specific. The
discussion of what level of internet activity will support the exercise of general
and specificjurisdictionwillbe divided into three categories: passive, interactive,
and middle range.
1. General Jurisdiction
The exercise of general jurisdiction depends on the defendant's presence and
activities in the state." Unlike specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction is not
limited to claims arising from in-state activities.'0 Once a state establishes that
it properly can assert general jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant can be
haled into the state's courts for reasons unrelated to the defendant's activities in
the state. 10 5
For example, a person who is domiciled in state A is subject to general
jurisdiction in state A. A business incorporated in state A is subject to general
jurisdiction in state A. A business incorporated in state Xbut with a principal
place of business in state A is subject to general jurisdiction in state A, as well as

99. See infranotes 129-38 and accompanying text.
100. See Bender, supranote 4, at 36.
101. Stockwell, supranote 26, at 890 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310,316 (1945); Core-Vent Corp. v.Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482,1485 (9thCir.
1993); BLACk'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999)).
102. Stockwell, supranote 26, at 890.
103. See Bender,supranote 4, at 36.
104. See Bender, supranote 4, at 37.
105. See Bender, supra note 4, at 86.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2

MISSOURILA W.REVIEW

[Vol. 66

state X. A corporation that is doing business in state A in a continuous and
systematic way will be considered to be present and subject to general jurisdiction
in stateA. A corporation that has sold two sprockets in state B during the past ten
years most likely will not be subject to general jurisdiction in state B. The
corporation's activities were occasional and sporadic, not continuous and
systematic-as requiredbythe Due Process Clause ofthe FourteenthAmendment;
therefore, the exercise of general jurisdiction would be improper. State A,
however, might be able to assert specific jurisdiction over the corporation if the
claim arises from the sale of the two sprockets." °6 Whether a defendant will be
subject to a suit in a foreign jurisdiction based onintemet contacts depends on the
web site's level of interactivity.
a. Passive Web Sites
As a general rule, a passive web site,1"0 without more, will not support the
exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.1" The defendant is not
doing business to such an extent that he or she can be considered present in the
forum by simplyproviding information." ° A finding ofgeneraljurisdiction inthis
case, would be a clear violation of the Due Process Clause.'
b. Interactive Web Sites
Even an interactive web site, without more, will not support the exercise of
general jurisdiction 11 If, however, the owner of the web site continuously and
systematically has done business in the forum state to the extent that the owner
can be said to be present in the state, the test for general jurisdiction will be
satisfied."' For example, suppose Charlie, a business owner, created an
interactive web siie in Florida. Through his web site, Charlie receives orders and
payments via credit card. The majority of his customers are in California.
Charlie's business receives significant revenue from his California customers. In
fact, Charlie fills approximately fifty large orders per week for California

106. For example, state A's power to assert specific jurisdiction depends on the
state's long ar statute and whether the sale of the two sprockets satisfies the minimum
contacts test
107. A web site that merely posts information for the consumers to see. See
Stockwell, supranote 26 and accompanying text.
108. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 890.
109. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 894.
110. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 894.
111. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 903-04.
112. See supranotes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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customers. If Charlie is sued in California on a claim unrelated to the sale of
sprockets, it is likely that the California court would assert general jurisdiction
over Charlie, based onhis presencein California, andwouldrequirehimto defend
the suit in California.
c. Middle-Range Web Sites
The middle range" of internet activity is far less defined." ' Nevertheless,
it is unlikely that an individual or entity will be subjected to general jurisdiction
in a foreign state based on a middle-range web site." Once again, suppose that
Charlie created a web site that provides information on sprockets. On his web
site, Charlie includes a feature allowing customers to email questions concerning
the sprockets. This would remove Charlie's web site from the passive category
and place it within the middle range. Furthermore, suppose that Charlie answers
questions fromNorthDakota citizens, but he never makes a sale inNorth Dakota,
or in any other state, through his web site. If Lucy sues Charlie in North Dakota
and her claim does not arise from any in-state activity, then Charlie's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction would be granted.
As stated above, the existence of a web site, without any further contacts
with the forum, will not support the exercise of personaljurisdiction."' There
must be something more to establish that the defendant purposefully directed
activities or established a presence through continuous and systematic activities
with some level of permanence in the state in question.

113. Middle-rangeweb sites do not support the sale ofproducts, as interactive sites
do; however, they contain something more thanthe mere posting ofinformation. Bender,
supra note 4, at 60-61,77-81. For an exTlanation of middle-range intemet activity, see
also supratext accompanying notes 95-99.
114. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 909-11.
115. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907,
910-12 (D. Or. 1999). The district court rejected the argument that a middle range of
activity could support generaljurisdiction per se. Id. The courtheld that allowing such
a web site to establish general jurisdiction would "eviscerate the personal jurisdiction
requirement as it currently exists." Id.at 910 (citing McDonough v. Farron McElligott,
Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996)); see also Citigroup, Inc. v. CityHolding Co.,
97 F: Supp. 2d 549, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The district court stated in dicta that it is
unlikelythatthe defendant's middle-rangeweb site and additional contacts would support
the exercise of generaljurisdiction, butitrefusedto decidetheissue afterfinding specific
jurisdiction was proper. Citigroup, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
116. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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2. Specific Jurisdiction
"Specific jurisdiction is a form of personal jurisdiction that arises from the
defendant having certain 'minimum contacts' with the forum state and permits the
court to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant only in cases arising from
those 'minimum contacts." 7 Courts must comply with both the forum state's
long arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
assert specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant."
Every state has a long arm statute. 9 The two general varieties are: (1)
constitution-based, and (2) menu-based. 2 ' California's long arm statute' is a
constitution-based statute. Constitution-based long arm statutes permit state
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the full
extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' In
contrast, menu-based statutes, such as New York's long arm statute,"m only allow
state courts to exercise personaljurisdiction over defendants who commit certain
acts specified in the statute.12
Nevertheless, those acts enumerated by menu-based long arm statutes, such
as New York's long arm statute, are subject to the purposeful availment
requirement." The fact that a defendant placed a product into the stream of
commerce does not mean that he or she has committed an act purposely directed
at the forum state. 2 6 An intent to target the forum state by a more affirmative
action on the part of the defendant is required."r As such, "the 'purposeful

117. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 890. For an explanation of specifio
jurisdiction and minimum contacts, see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th
Cir. 1993); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).
118. See Stockwell, supranote 26, at 890.
119. See Stockwell, supranote 26, at 891.
120. See Stockwell, supranote 26, at 891.
121. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 2001). For other
examples of Constitution-based long arm statutes, see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33
(1997); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031, § 3 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 2001).
122. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 891.
123. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (vcKinney 1990 & Supp. 2001).
124. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 891.
125. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 (1985) (The forum state may exercise specifio jurisdiction
if the foreign defendant purposely directs his activities at the forum and the injury in
controversy arises from or is related to his activity.).
126. Asahi Metal Indus, Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
127. Kevin R. Lyn, PersonalJurisdictionand the Internet: Is a Home Page
Enough to Satisfy Minimum Contacts?,22 CAMPBELL L. REv. 341,345 (2000).
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availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as the result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated'
contacts."'
Whether aweb site will supportthe exercise of specificjurisdiction
depends on the interactivity of the site. The discussion of current case law will
divide the internet contacts as passive, active, and middle ground. For the
purposes of this Note, not all cases will be discussed. Instead, the focus will be
on general themes that seem to be emerging in the area.
a. Passive Web Sites
The general rule is that a passive web site will not support the exercise of
specific jurisdiction.'
Some courts, however, have held that the assertion of
jurisdiction was proper in passive web site cases, usually because the web site
contained a distinguishing factor, such as a toll-free number for customer use, or
because the case was regulatory or criminal in nature.'

128. BurgerKing,471 U.S. at475 (quotingKeetonv. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770,774 (1983); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,299
(1980)).
129. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (Ie
defendant, a Missouri resident and owner of the "Blue Note," a small night club in
Columbia, Missouri, was sued for trademark infringement by the plaintif owner of the
'Blue Note" in New York. The alleged infringement occurred on the defendant's web
site, whichwas usedtopostupcoming events and ticket information. The courtheldthat
the defendant did nothing to purposefully avail himself to the forum state. The court
analogized creating a web site to placing a product in the stream of commerce, which,
without more, does not constitute an act purposefully directed toward the forum.); Lyn,
supranote 127, at 60; Pelzer, supranote 28, at 749; see also 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech
Lab., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373,1380 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding thatmaintenance ofaweb site,
which was accessible to California residents, was not sufficient to support the exercise
ofpersonaljurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417-18 (9th
Cir. 1997) (In this trademark inffingement case in which the defendant operated a web
site allegedly containing the plaintiffs registered mark and a domain name that
resembledthat mark, the plaintiffargued forthe existence of specific jurisdiction, andthe
United States Court ofAppeals fortheNinthCircuitheldthat"therehadto be 'something
more' to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his
activity in a substantial way to the forum state." The court compared Inset Sstems v.
InstructionSet, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996), to the facts in Cyberselland
found that the existence of the toll-free number in Inset was the distinguishing factor
between the two cases. ); Transcraft Corp. v.DoonanTrailer Corp., No. 97C4943, 1997

WL733905, *8-10 (N.D. Il Nov. 17,1997) (holdingthatthe exercise ofjurisdictionwas
not proper); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *10-12
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (holding that the exercise ofjurisdiction was not proper).
130. See Inset Sys. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)
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Suppose Charlie, a business owner in Florida, created a web site that merely
advertises his product. If Lucy sues Charlie in Ohio alleging trademark
infringement and Charlie moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
Charlie's motion most likely would be granted, absent some other contacts with
the state or a distinguishing factor on the web site, such as a toll-free number or
a statement encouraging email communication.
b. Interactive Web Sites
Generally, an interactive web site accessible in the forum state will support
the exercise of specificjurisdiction" However, there are few cases dealing with
interactive web sites. In cases of alleged trademark infringement, access to an
interactive web site typically would be enough to support specific jurisdiction.
However, constitutional standards still must be satisfied. The defendant's site

(Instruction's web site had a toll-free number to solicit customers and was available in
Connecticut Also, Instruction's web site was used to advertise services and contained
a toll-free number to allow potential customers to notify the defendant Inset may
represent a liberal interpretation of additional activity, but the appearance of a toll-free
number has been used as a distinction between passive web sites that do not support
jurisdiction and those that do. It is an exception to the general rule, but at least one court
has held that merely maintaining a web site with advertisements can support personal
jurisdiction.); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 76743 1, at
*11 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996) (holding that the defendant had met the purposeful
availment requirement for personal jurisdiction because the advertisements should have
put the defendant on notice that it could be sued in Minnesota); see also Pelzer, supra
note 28, at 752-753 (Under this rule, which is not followed by the majority, jurisdiction
would be proper in any place that the advertisement could be accessed.).
131. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The defendant, a California corporation with its principal place of business in
Sunnydale, California, owned domain names incorporating the plaintiffs mark and
operated a web site containing that mark. Id. at 1121. The interet news service that the
defendant operated through its web site contained two levels ofnews service thatrequired
customers to complete an application online and pay for the service by credit card; in
return, the subscriber received a password and could download the defendant's news
service. Id. Seven internet access providers entered into contracts with the defendant so
that subscribers could view the news service from the forum state. Id. Subscribers from
Pennsylvania, the forum state, constituted two percent of the defendant's subscribers.
Id. Those subscribers withinthe forum state became customers by completing the online
application. Id. The United States District Court forthe Western District ofPennsylvania
held that the activities ofthe defendant were sufficient to support the exercise ofpersonal
jurisdiction because the defendant's interet activities went beyond the mere posting of
information, and the court determined that the defendant actually conducted business on
the internet Id. at 1126.
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actually must be viewed by citizens in the forum state or the defendant actually
must conduct business over the internet with citizens in the forum state.
Assume again that Charlie created an interactive web site through which he
takes orders for sprockets and receives payments from customers via credit card.
Charlie has sold sprockets in Missouri for the past few years. Inthattime, he has
received many orders from Missouri citizens. If Charlie is sued in Missouri for
a claim arising from his internet conduct, he most likely would be subject to
specific jurisdiction in Missouri.
c. Middle-Range Web Sites
Courts are split in their analysis of middle-range internet activity.'
Depending on the nature and level of the information exchange in such cases,
specific jurisdiction may be proper." Analysis of middle-range web sites is
extremely fact sensitive. Most courts have held that the existence of a middlerange web site with some additional evidence ofpurposeful availmentwill support
the exercise of specific jurisdiction." 4
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon, however, in
Millennium Enterprises,Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP,135 declined to exercise

132. See Stockwell, supra note 26, at 895.
133. See Stockwell, supranote 26, at 895-96.
134. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
The court held that the operation of the defendant's web site was sufficient to support
personaljurisdiction. Id.at 1334. Users provided the defendant a list of interests, and
the defendant forwarded advertisements to users consistent with those interests. Id. at
1330. Forum state users had accessed the site 131 times. Id. The court found that,
because the internet is a more efficient means ofreaching large numbers ofpeople, mail
andphone analogies are unpersuasive-a finding similar to theInset court Id. at 1334;
see Vitullov. VelocityPowerboats, Inc.,No. 97C8745,1998 WL 246152, at*6-7 (N.D.
IML Apr. 27,1998); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34,39,44-45 (D.

Mass. 1997) (holdingtheweb sitetobeinteractivebecauseitincluded atoll-freenumber
and encouraged email communication); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1,

5-6 (D.D.C. 1996).
135. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D.Or. 1999). The plaintiff alleged that the defendanthad
infingedits trademarkrights inthename' MusicMlllennium." Id. at909. Theplaintiff
in arguing for specific jurisdiction, noted that the defendant sold one compact disc to an
Oregonresident, purchased some inventory from an Oregon distributor, and maintained
anintemetweb site. Id.at 911. The courtrejected the firsttwo contacts as sporadic. Id.
at 910. The plaintiff also asserted that the court had specific jurisdiction over the
defendant Id. The court inits analysis of case law noted that the trend is to reject
personal jurisdiction based on a passive web site. Id. at 915-16. In cases where the
defendant does business through the internet, the court found the cases asserting
jurisdiction to be persuasive. Id. Also, the court noted that, when a defendant
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jurisdiction over the defendant. 13 6 In its discussion, the court commented that

further refinement was needed in the middle category of web site contacts
described in Zippo.'37 To find jurisdiction, the court required "deliberate action
within the forum state in the form of transactions between the defendant and
residents of the forum or conduct of the defendant purposefully directed at
residents of the forum state." '
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Citigroup,Inc. v. CityHoldingCo.,""the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York considered whether New York law allowed for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant and whether exercising
jurisdiction comported with due process.14 ° In deciding whether personal
jurisdiction was proper, the court primarily applied New York's long arm
statute."' The court stated that the statute required "'a strong nexus between the
plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's in state conduct."'' 4 Much of the
defendant's activity that contributed to the assertion of specific jurisdiction
occurred through the defendant's web site."4 Because of this, the court also
considered what type of internet activity would be sufficient to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.'" In its analysis of the

intentionally directs its activities at the forum state, purposeful availment could be

properly found under the "effects test." Id. at 921. The court commented, as a result of
independent review of the current case law, that an interactive web site, alone, was
enough to satisfy minimum contacts for some courts, some courts required additional
activity in the forum related to the forum, and other courts found minimum contacts
through additional, non-internet activity, whether or not related to the claim. Id. at 92223. The defendant had not made any deliberate orrepeated contacts with the forum state
through its web site. As a result, the contacts could not be related to the alleged tort
because the contacts were not related to the claim. The court declined to assert
jurisdiction over the defendant Id. at 921-23. The reasoning behind the ruling was that
a finding of specific jurisdiction based on additional contacts unrelated to the cause of
action would blur the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. Id. at 923.
136. Id. at 924.
137. Id. at 921.
138. Id.
139. 97 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
140. Id.at 564.
141. For New York's long ain statute, see supranote 20.
142. Citigroup,97 F. Supp. at 564 (quoting Welsh v. Servicemaster Corp., 9 30 F.
Supp. 908, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).

143. Id.at 564-65.
144. Id.at 565.
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defendant's conduct and the enumerated acts in New York's long ann statute, the
jurisdiction over the defendant was
court determined that the exercise ofpersonal
145
process.
due
with
comported
and
proper
Inanalyzingwhetherjurisdictionunderthetransactingbusiness sectionofthe
long ann statute was proper, the court analyzed the nature and quality of the
defendant's commercial internet activity.' The court referred to the panoply of
cases discussed in Zippo 4' and Compuserve," and decided that because the
defendant, City National, maintained two web sites that allowed New York
residents to apply for loans online, print out applications to submit by mail or
facsimile, chat online with loan representatives, and email the defendant with
home loan questions that the case fell within the middle range of internet
activity.'4 9 According to the court, middle-ground web site activitymaybe a basis
for personal jurisdiction depending on the level and nature of the exchange of
information among users in the forum state and the defendant"' Because the
court deemed the interaction to be significant and commercial in nature, the court
concluded that the activity rose to the level required under New York's long arm
5
statute.' '
In addition, the court held that the exercise ofjurisdiction based on web site
activities was bolstered by other activities. 5 Those other activities included
direct mail solicitation of New York residents and City National's use of New
York companies to perfect liens on real property located within New York by
recording mortgages on the defendant's behalf'
The court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over City Holding
was proper under the first section of New York's long arm statute because City
Holding was the licensor and owner ofthe allegedlyinfringing trademark ' City
National, City Holding's wholly-owned subsidiary and licensee ofthe trademark,
used the licensed material in commerce in New York pursuant to a license
agreement' Even when the license agreement does not specificallyprovide for

145.
146.
147.
Pa. 1997).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 564-70.
Id. at 565.
Zippo Mfg. Co. v.Zippo Dot Corn Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D.
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
Citigroup,97 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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use in New York, the licensor may be subjected to personal jurisdiction if use of
the licensed material in New York was foreseeable.15 6
Next, the court discussed the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the
second enumerated item in New York's long arm statute."' This section confers
jurisdiction over a defendant who commits a tortious act in the state when the
cause of action arises from that act." 8 There is no minimum activity required as
long as the claim arises from the infringing activity in New York. 5 9 The court
stated that "' [o]ffering one copy of an infringing work for sale in New York...
constitutes commission of a tortious act within the state sufficient to imbue [the]
court with personal jurisdiction over the infringers. ' "' Because City National
solicited business by sending direct mailings containing the allegedly infringing
marks to New York residents, the court considered this an attempt to pass the
marks, and, thus, the direct mailing allegedly was atort.1 The court held that the
direct mailings constituted a tortious act within the State of New York, and,
therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper. 62
Also, the court analyzed City National's web site activity and considered
whether such activity conferred jurisdiction under the section of the long arm
statute providing jurisdiction over defendants who commit tortious acts within the
state.
The court noted that the state where the web site was created or
maintained is the state in which the tort is said to have been committed in cases
of web sites containing allegedly infringing marks.' City National's web site
was neither created nor maintained in New York 65 Therefore, the existence of
such a web site could not confer jurisdiction; however, users could chat with City

156. Id.
157. Id. at 564-68.
158. Id. at 566.
159. Id. at 567.
160. Id. (quoting Editorial Musical Latino Americana, S.A. v. Mar Int'l Records,
Inc., 829 F. Supp. 62, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). Inthis copyright infringement case inwhich
the defendant copied the plaintiffs copyrighted work on a phonograph and distributed
such records in New York for sale, the court held that actual sale of the records was
unnecessary to establish personal jurisdiction. Id. It was enough that the defendant
offered the copies for sale. Id. FourNew Yorkretailers carried the defendant's products.
Id. The court found that the exercise of specific jurisdiction was proper under New
York's long arm statute's enumeration covering tortious acts committed within the state.
Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 566-67.
164. Id. at 567.
165. Id.
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Nationalrepresentatives throughthe web site." The emailmessages sentto New
York residents containing the allegedly infringing marks were claimed to have
been apassing offof the marks withinthe state instead of outside the state." The
court used this internet activity as additional evidence to support the exercise of
personaljurisdictionunder the second section of New York's long ann statute." s
Section three of New York's long arm statute provides for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the claim arises "out of a tort
committed outside the [S]tate of New York but the tort causes harm within New
York, the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have
consequences in the state, and the defendant derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce."'6 9 The tortious activity relating to the
posting of allegedly infringing material on a web site is not believed to occur
where viewed, because this would confer essentially worldwide jurisdiction."
Because of this, the court reasoned that any tortious activity occurring in relation
infringing material must be said to have occurred
to the posting of allegedly
7
outside of New York '
The court commented that, when a New York business is harmed by lost
sales or lost customers, an injury has occurred within the State of New York."
Citigroup claimed that its customers were confused and deceived when they
viewed the defendant's web site." Thus, injury occurred inthe state as required
by the statute.' The court declared that the defendant reasonably should have
expected that publication of the web site containing the allegedly infiinging
materialwould cause injuryinNewYork."' Because CityNational, through City
Mortgage, had more than eighty thousand accounts nationwide, solicited home
equity and mortgage loans nationwide, and serviced nearly $2 billion in loans, the
court concluded that the defendant engaged in interstate commerce. ' 76 Moreover,
CityNational had branches inthree states and was insured bythe Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, which further proved the defendant's involvement in

166.
167.
168.
169.
2001)).
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567-68 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1990 & Supp.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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interstate commerce."7 According to the court, the plaintiff's claim arose from a
tort committed by the defendant outside of New York"' 8 Nevertheless, the
plaintiff suffered foreseeable harm within the State of New York, and the
defendant engaged in interstate commerce.'
Therefore, exercise of specific
jurisdiction over the defendant was proper under New York's long arm statute.18
The exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper only if it comports with due
process.'
Due process is satisfied if the defendant had "'certain minimum
contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
' The court stated that
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ""
it "considered the factors relevant to this inquiry and [found] that the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants wouldnot offendthe standards
of due process."'"
Because the court found that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the
defendant was proper, it declined to decide the issue ofgeneraljurisdiction. 1 4 The
court, however, did discuss the issue." The court stated that, if a foreign
corporation conducted business with a fair measure of permanence, it might be
subjected to personal jurisdiction in New York-even without physical
presence. 86 New York courts generally have focused on the presence of
employees or agents, the existence of an office, the solicitation of business, or the
presence of bank accounts or other property in New York as a basis for general
jurisdiction.' 8' In New York, the finding of a corporate presence will not be
justified by the solicitation of business alone." If,
however, the defendant
engaged in other a6tivities in the state along with continuous and substantial
solicitation, then general jurisdiction may be found under the "solicitation plus"

test.1' The court indicated that the defendant's internet activity was substantial
and continuous for the purpose of establishing specific jurisdiction, but it was
unlikelythatthe defendant's actions would have supported the exercise ofgeneral

177. Id.

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.

182. Id. at 569 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
183. Id.at 568.
184. Id. at 570.
185. Id.at 568-70.

186. Id. at 569.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.at 571.
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jurisdiction.W' Moreover, the court stated that it was not convinced that the
activities of the defendant would support the exercise of general jurisdiction even
under the solicitation plus testW Because of the finding of specificjurisdiction
and underdeveloped law concerning the exercise ofgeneraljurisdiction supported
by internet activities, the court did not decide the issue of generaljurisdiction.'

V. COMMENT
The United States District Court for the SouthernDistrict of New York held
that the exercise of specific jurisdiction was proper under all three enumerated
acts expressed in New York's long arm statute.'
Admittedly, the court's
decisionto exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant did not extendbeyond
the outer reaches of existing case law on the subject.' The court's analysis,
however, indicated thatthe defendant's actions met the requirements of all of the
enumerated acts ofthe New Yorklong arm statute. 5 Itwas not onlyunnecessary
for the court to make such a holding, but also dangerous.
The court found that the defendant's internet activity, coupled with the use
of direct mailings and the employment of New York companies to record liens on
mortgaged property, was enough to assert specific jurisdiction under the doing
business section of the long arm statute.19 The defendant's use of New York
mortgage companies, however, was a sporadic and attenuated activity, and the
plaintiff's claim did not arise from this activity.'
The direct mail solicitation may prove that the defendant attempted to
transact business in New York, but the question whether one direct mailing
constitutes regularly soliciting business for the purpose of the long arm statute is
a real concern."9 Furthermore, no facts presented in this case proved that the
defendant actually had any New York customers as a result of its web site or its
direct mail solicitation. The court seemed to say that advertising in a state and
answering questions regarding services offered is enoughto constitute "conducting
business," as required by the long arm statute. If carried to its logical conclusion,
this would mean that anyone who had a web site, in at least the middle range of
activity, and who participated in another mode of advertising, such as a national

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id. at 570-71
Id.
For New York's long ann statute, see supranote 20.
See supranotes 129-38 and accompanying text
See supranotes 152-68 and accompanying text
For New York's long arm statute, see supranote 20.
See supranotes 129-38 and accompanying text.
For New York's long anm statute, see supranote 20.
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newspaper or direct mail solicitation, conducted business in New York under the
state's long arm statute.
Next, the court found that specific jurisdiction was proper because the
defendant's activities constituted the commission of a tort within the State of New
York 1 The court heldthatthe directmailings containing the allegedly infringing
marks constituted a tortious act committed in New York, stating that "'offering
one copy of an infringing work for sale in New York... constitutes a tortious act
within the state sufficient to imbue the court with personal jurisdiction over the
infringer.""' ° The case the court cited, however, dealt with offering bootleg
copies of copyrighted musical works for sale, not advertising with an allegedly
infringing trademark The court also found that while the existence of the
defendant's web site, alone, would not confer jurisdiction, the interactivity of the
web site would. According to the court, by sending email messages containing the
allegedly infringing marks to web site users, the defendant met the requirement of
the second section of the long arm statute.
The defendant's web site had a feature through which users could email a
question to the defendant and the question would be answered by the defendant's
representatives within an hour.2" 1 The defendant's responses to web site users,
however, hardly could be called a purposeful activity directed at the forum.
Cyberspace has no geographical boundaries. When the defendant's employees
received email messages, in all likelihood, they did not know from which state
those messages originated. The defendant's employees were replying to email
addresses, which did notreveal a physical location. By answering email messages
indiscriminately, the defendant did not intentionally direct any activity toward the
State of New York
Finally, the court considered the long arm statute's third enumerated act and
found that the defendant's web site activity constituted a tort committed outside
of New York, causing foreseeable harm within the State of New York.2" The
analysis applied by the court was similar to the effects test established by
Calder.2" The effects test, however, required intentional harm." 4 New York's
long arm statute has no such requirement.2"° The effect of the holding in this case

199. See supra notes 152-84 and accompanying text.
200. Citigroup, Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549,567 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(quoting Editorial Musical Latino Americana, S.A. v. Mar Int'l Records, Inc., 829 F.
Supp. 62,64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
201. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
203. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). For a discussion of the effects test, see
supranotes 77-83 and accompanying text.
204. See supranotes 77-83 and accompanying text
205. For New York's long arm statute, see supra note 20.
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is that, in a trademark infringement case, the mere existence of a web site in the
middle ground of interactivity will confer jurisdiction in whatever state injury
occurs. This rule, obviously, is better than a rule stating that the defendant could
be haled into court anywhere the web site could be viewed. Nevertheless, the two
rules are not far apart
The establishment of a web site is the only contactneeded. Once a claim of
trademark infringement is made and the plaintiff states that those who view the
site are confused, according to the Citigroupcourt, there is injury as required by
New York's long arm statute. In essence, all the plaintiff must do to hale a
foreign defendant into court intheplaintiff's jurisdiction is establish aprima facie
case that the defendant (1) has a web site, (2) displayed allegedly infringing
materials, and (3) confused potential customers viewing the web site inthe forum
state; this is not a difficult burden.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Citigroupwill not reconcile the current hodgepodge of case
law on jurisdiction in cyberspace. There is no universally accepted standard or
rule of law to follow when deciding if the middle ground of internet activity will
confer jurisdiction over the defendant in a foreign state. Many would like to see

theintemetcontrolledbytraditionallegal standards. Others, however, realizethat
the worldwide cyber-market does not lend itself to traditional geographically
based standards ofjurisprudence.
As a result, the best suggestion for Charlie, the small business owner, is to
keep his web site within the passive range of activity or immediately hire a good
attorney. For others concerned with trademark infringement on the internet the
critical fact to keep in mind is that local marks may infringe upon someone else's
marks in aforeignjurisdiction. The best way to avoid this potential liability is to
checkotherjurisdictionsbeforepostingpotentiallyinfringingmarks. Ifnecessary,
then exclude people from the jurisdiction containing any marks that could be
infringed upon from accessing the web site. This is the best defense.
ERICAD. O'LoUGHLIN
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